Competition Policy with a Coasian Prior?

University of Aarhus Economics Working Paper 1998-17

Posted: 8 Dec 1998

See all articles by Svend Hylleberg

Svend Hylleberg

Aarhus University - Department of Economics

Per Baltzer Overgaard

Aarhus University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 1998

Abstract

In a recent report commissioned by the Norwegian government, a group of experts have presented a new framework for Norwegian competition analysis and policy, see von der Fehr, Norman, Reve and Ryssdal (1998). In conclusion, we believe the report represents a major contribution to the discussion of competition analysis and policy of the NCA, and we strongly recommend it to all those interested in these topics. The proposed three-step incentive-based approach to analysis is particularly appealing in terms of its general perspective on competition policy. However, we would conjecture that the main challenge for the proponents of the procedure is not to convince economists and the economics profession about the advantage of an incentive-based approach, but rather to generate a similar consensus among all the different groups and agencies that shape antitrust (and regulation). The three-step incentive-based approach may be successfully implemented only if the whole system subscribes to its philosophical premises, and it may be hazardous to implement it without creating an understanding among the participants beforehand.

JEL Classification: K2, L4, L5

Suggested Citation

Hylleberg, Svend and Overgaard, Per Baltzer, Competition Policy with a Coasian Prior? (1998). University of Aarhus Economics Working Paper 1998-17. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=139289

Svend Hylleberg (Contact Author)

Aarhus University - Department of Economics ( email )

University Park
DK-8000 Aarhus C
Denmark
+45 8942 1133 (Phone)
+45 8613 6334 (Fax)

Per Baltzer Overgaard

Aarhus University - Department of Economics ( email )

University Park
DK-8000 Aarhus C
Denmark
+45 8942 1605 (Phone)

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