Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings
24 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2009
Date Written: April 21, 2009
Abstract
One argument for forcing governments to pay compensation for regulatory takings is that they will tend to over regulate if compensation is not paid. In this paper, a model is developed in which there are two groups in society, one of which bears all of the costs of regulation. Regulation provides (potentially unequal) benefits to both groups. In the absence of compensation, a biased government will not choose the efficient level of regulation. If taxes are non-distorting, a compensation rule can be designed to achieve the first best outcome. The optimal rule always involves a positive degree of compensation regardless of the direction of the government bias. If the government is biased in favor of the regulated group, then compensation will increase the level of the regulation. When taxes are distortionary, the first best outcome cannot be achieved, and the optimal level of compensation may be 0.
Keywords: Takings, Regulation, Compensation
JEL Classification: K2, H4, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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