The Slippery Slope of Concession

9 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2009

See all articles by Jack Hirshleifer

Jack Hirshleifer

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michele Boldrin

Washington University in St. Louis

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Abstract

We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which actions may be helpful in such unfortunate circumstances.

Suggested Citation

Hirshleifer, Jack and Boldrin, Michele and Levine, David K., The Slippery Slope of Concession. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47, Issue 2, pp. 197-205, April 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1393935 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x

Jack Hirshleifer (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michele Boldrin

Washington University in St. Louis ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1208
Saint Louis, MO MO 63130-4899
United States

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
349
PlumX Metrics