Bidding to Give: An Experimental Comparison of Auctions for Charity

27 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009

See all articles by Arthur J. H. C. Schram

Arthur J. H. C. Schram

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB); Tinbergen Institute

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Abstract

We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

Schram, Arthur J. H. C. and Onderstal, Sander, Bidding to Give: An Experimental Comparison of Auctions for Charity. International Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 431-457, May 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1393939 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00536.x

Arthur J. H. C. Schram (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 18
CREED
Amsterdam 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 (0)20 525 4293 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/creed/PEOPLE/Arthurs.htm

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
413
PlumX Metrics