Bidding to Give: An Experimental Comparison of Auctions for Charity
27 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009
Abstract
We experimentally compare three mechanisms used to raise money for charities: first-price winner-pay auctions, first-price all-pay auctions, and lotteries. We stay close to the characteristics of most charity auctions by using an environment with incomplete information and independent private values. Our results support theoretical predictions by showing that the all-pay format raises substantially higher revenue than the other mechanisms.
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Bidding to Give: An Experimental Comparison of Auctions for Charity
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