Background Considerations to a Regulation of the U.S. Financial System: Third Time a Charm? Or Strike Three?

Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 557

20 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2009

See all articles by Jan A. Kregel

Jan A. Kregel

Bard College - The Levy Economics Institute

Date Written: April 24, 2009

Abstract

U.S. financial regulation has traditionally made functional and institutional regulation roughly equivalent. However, the gradual shift away from Glass-Steagall and the introduction of the Financial Modernization Act (FMA) generated a disorderly mix of functions and products across institutions, creating regulatory gaps that contributed to the recent crisis. An analysis of this history suggests that a return to regulation by function or product would strengthen regulation. The FMA also made a choice in favor of financial holding companies over universal banks, but without recognizing that both types of structure require specific regulatory regimes. The paper reviews the specific regime that has been used by Germany in regulating its universal banks and suggests that a similar regime adapted to holding companies should be developed.

Keywords: Financial reregulation, Glass-Steagall, Financial Modernization Act, German Universal Bank Regulation, Prudential Regulation

JEL Classification: G21, G28, F33, F36

Suggested Citation

Kregel, Jan A., Background Considerations to a Regulation of the U.S. Financial System: Third Time a Charm? Or Strike Three? (April 24, 2009). Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 557. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1394460 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1394460

Jan A. Kregel (Contact Author)

Bard College - The Levy Economics Institute ( email )

Blithewood
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504
United States
845-758-7700 (Phone)
845-758-1149 (Fax)

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