Hold Your Nose and Vote: Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption?

34 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2009

See all articles by Marco Pani

Marco Pani

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Middle East and Central Asia Department

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, some citizens can indirectly benefit from corruption. The paper shows that, under this condition, if the citizens anticipate a shift in policy preferences in favor of higher public expenditure, they may support institutional arrangements that favor corruption (such as a weak enforcement of the law) in order to alter future policy decisions in their favor. This result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in a democracyto some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system. It also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community.

Keywords: Corruption, Developed countries, Developing countries, Governance, Political economy, Government expenditures, Private sector, Legislation, Economic models

Suggested Citation

Pani, Marco, Hold Your Nose and Vote: Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? (April 2009). IMF Working Paper No. 09/83, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1394803

Marco Pani (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Middle East and Central Asia Department ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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