Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An Edifice Without a Keystone?

27 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2009

See all articles by Ruth Dukes

Ruth Dukes

School of Law, University of Glasgow

Abstract

This paper describes Otto Kahn-Freund's advocacy of the British ‘collective laissez-faire’ system of regulation of industrial relations, in which regulation proceeded autonomously of the state. It suggests that a weakness of collective laissez-faire as a normative principle was its failure to make adequate provision for the furtherance of the public interest. It links this failure to a more general reluctance, on the part of Kahn-Freund, to conceive of the state as representative of the public interest. And it seeks to explain this reluctance with reference to Kahn-Freund's experiences of living and working as a labour court judge in the Weimar Republic, and of moving to the UK as a refugee from Nazism.

Suggested Citation

Dukes, Ruth, Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An Edifice Without a Keystone?. Modern Law Review, Vol. 72, Issue 2, pp. 220-246, March 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1395106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2009.00741.x

Ruth Dukes (Contact Author)

School of Law, University of Glasgow ( email )

Stair Building
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Glasgow, Scotland G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

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