Judicial Review in Hungarian Competition Law -Tetra Laval Á La Hongroise

21 Pages Posted: 7 May 2009 Last revised: 30 Mar 2011

Kati Cseres

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance and Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics

Jurian Langer

University of Amsterdam

Date Written: April 28, 2009

Abstract

This paper assesses the degree of judicial scrutiny performed by administrative courts in Hungary when reviewing decisions by the Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, ‘GVH’) in the light of the landmark ruling handed down by the European Court of Justice in Commission vs. Tetra Laval. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part provides an outline of the Hungarian Competition Act. The second part offers a brief overview of the general principles of judicial review of the Hungarian administrative authorities’ decisions. The third part examines whether the Tetra Laval ruling has influenced the judicial scrutiny applied by Hungarian courts. The fourth part concludes that although at first sight the Hungarian courts seem to draw little or no inspiration at all from the Community Courts’ case-law, a deeper analysis suggests that - irrespective of the developments in European jurisprudence - the Hungarian courts have in essence developed a finely tuned and restrained judicial review of the GVH decisions.The conclusions of this analysis point further than the Hungarian case and provides thoughts for the general discussion on the standard of judicial review of administrative authorities’ decisions.

Keywords: Antitrust law, Judicial Review, Hungary

JEL Classification: K21, K39

Suggested Citation

Cseres, Kati and Langer, Jurian, Judicial Review in Hungarian Competition Law -Tetra Laval Á La Hongroise (April 28, 2009). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2009-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1396242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1396242

Kati Cseres (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance and Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics ( email )

Oudemanshuispoort 4-6
Amsterdam, 1012 CN
Netherlands

Jurian Langer

University of Amsterdam ( email )

P.O.Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands

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