Golden Gate III, ERISA Preemption, and the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance

25 Pages Posted: 4 May 2009 Last revised: 27 Nov 2009

See all articles by Edward A. Zelinsky

Edward A. Zelinsky

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Date Written: April 1, 2009

Abstract

An exploration of the most recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and County of San Francisco (Golden Gate III) indicates that ERISA Section 514(a) preempts the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance. Two premises guide this exploration of Golden Gate III. First, employers' ongoing payments to health care administrators, such as insurance companies, constitute employee benefit "plans" for ERISA purposes. Second, employers' contributions are central features of their employee plans.

This first premise indicates that a San Francisco employer which regularly contributes to San Francisco pursuant to that City's health ordinance thereby creates a "plan" for ERISA purposes. The ERISA status of this plan purchasing municipally-administered medical services is the same as the ERISA status of an analogous employer-financed plan paying a private administrator for comparable health care: As to all of these plans, ERISA Section 514(a) preempts state and local regulation. Moreover, it is not persuasive for purposes of ERISA Section 514 to say (as does the Ninth Circuit) that San Francisco, by its health care ordinance, regulates employers' health care contributions, but not employers' health care plans. Contributions are central features of employers' health care plans for their employees. By regulating employers' contributions, San Francisco regulates employers' plans.

Keywords: preemption, ERISA, health care, San Francisco, San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance

Suggested Citation

Zelinsky, Edward A., Golden Gate III, ERISA Preemption, and the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance (April 1, 2009). State Tax Notes, Forthcoming, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 261, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1396356

Edward A. Zelinsky (Contact Author)

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )

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