R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics WP No. 328

34 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 1999

See all articles by Bruno Cassiman

Bruno Cassiman

IESE Business School; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)

Reinhilde Veugelers

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Applied Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: 1998

Abstract

This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationship between R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.

JEL Classification: D21, L13, O31, O32

Suggested Citation

Cassiman, Bruno and Veugelers, Reinhilde, R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence (1998). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics WP No. 328. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=139697 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.139697

Bruno Cassiman (Contact Author)

IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
+34 93 602 4426 (Phone)
+34 93 253 4343 (Fax)

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Reinhilde Veugelers

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Applied Economics ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32 16 32 6908 (Phone)
+32 16 32 6732 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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