The Labor Market and Corporate Structure

Posted: 29 Nov 1998

See all articles by Daron Acemoglu

Daron Acemoglu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 1997

Abstract

We analyze the impact of labor demand and labor market regulations on the corporate structure of firms. We find that higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labor market regulations, unions or higher labor demand. These comparative static results are in line with the broad trends in the data. We also find that the organization of firms has important macroeconomic implications. In particular, monitoring is a type of "rent-seeking" activity and the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive resources on monitoring. Labor market regulations that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net output or reduce it only by a small amount even though they reduce employment.

JEL Classification: J41, L23

Suggested Citation

Acemoglu, Daron and Newman, Andrew F., The Labor Market and Corporate Structure (June 1997). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=139699

Daron Acemoglu (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Boston, MA 02215
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