State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies

8 Pages Posted: 1 May 2009

See all articles by Konstantin Sonin

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 30, 2009

Abstract

State capture by industrial lobbyists is a significant obstacle to normal economic development of formerly command (socialist) economies, at both the local and the national levels. It is prevalent in transition economics because of an excessively concentrated industrial structure and low labour mobility, both horizontal and vertical, a high level of discretion of public officials in economic affairs, and generally weak political institutions. Most of these features might be traced back to the pre-transition legacy.

Keywords: barriers to entry, command economy, corruption, decentralization, enforcement of contracts, mobility, local government, oligarchs, property rights protection, rule of law, special interests, state capture, transition and institutions, transition economies

Suggested Citation

Sonin, Konstantin, State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies (April 30, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1397325 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1397325

Konstantin Sonin (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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