The Market for Corporate Control and CEO Compensation: Complements or Substitutes?

Posted: 6 May 2009

See all articles by Shijun Cheng

Shijun Cheng

Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF), Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Raffi Indjejikian

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Accounting

Date Written: May 5, 2009

Abstract

We study the relation between firms’ internal governance mechanisms and the market for corporate control by examining how CEO compensation changed following the enactment of anti-takeover laws by various states in the 1980s. We find that CEOs are paid more after controlling for performance and their compensation is more sensitive to performance (both stock returns and accounting return-on-assets) following the enactment of these laws. We also find that the increased sensitivity to performance is attributable only to the “good luck” components of stock returns and accounting return-on-assets (defined as the positive components of performance attributed to market and industry factors). We interpret these findings as consistent with the view that the market for corporate control and CEO compensation are complementary governance mechanisms.

Keywords: Anti-takeover laws, CEO compensation, Performance-based Incentives, Corporate governance

JEL Classification: J33, G12, G24, G34, G38, M41

Suggested Citation

Cheng, Shijun and Indjejikian, Raffi J., The Market for Corporate Control and CEO Compensation: Complements or Substitutes? (May 5, 2009). Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1399469

Shijun Cheng

Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF), Shanghai Jiao Tong University ( email )

211 West Huaihai Road
Shanghai, 200030
China

Raffi J. Indjejikian (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Accounting ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
2,182
PlumX Metrics