Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings

ISER Discussion Paper No. 735

9 Pages Posted: 15 May 2009

See all articles by Kentaro Hatsumi

Kentaro Hatsumi

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Institute of Social and Economic Research

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: April 1, 2009

Abstract

We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. We investigate a rule satisfying candidate stability, which is the requirement to deter any candidate from strategic withdrawal. We show that a rule satisfies candidate stability if and only if it satisfies independence of the selection for each candidate.

Keywords: multiple-winner election, strategic candidacy, separable preference, voting by committees

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Hatsumi, Kentaro and Economic Research, Institute of Social and, Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings (April 1, 2009). ISER Discussion Paper No. 735, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1400507 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1400507

Kentaro Hatsumi (Contact Author)

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

Institute of Social and Economic Research

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
81-6-6879-8555 (Phone)
81-6-6879-8583 (Fax)

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