Electoral Competition and Low Contribution Limits

28 Pages Posted: 7 May 2009 Last revised: 26 Nov 2019

See all articles by Kahlil Williams

Kahlil Williams

New York University (NYU) - Brennan Center for Justice

Thomas Stratmann

George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy; George Mason University - Mercatus Center; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy

Stetson University College of Law

Date Written: May 7, 2009

Abstract

Electoral competition is essential to democracy. Yet the incumbency rate in state-house legislative campaigns is nearly 95 percent. This report examines campaign contribution limits and the impact limits can have on electoral competition. The research on which this report is based was inspired by a 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision Randall v. Sorrell that overturned Vermont's low contribution limits. The data presented here refutes the Court's assumptions that low contribution limits damage challengers and shows that the lowest contribution limits, those set at $500 or below, enhance challengers' ability to campaign against incumbents in state legislative races.

Though public financing systems also increase electoral competition, the Brennan Center's research suggests that incumbents nonetheless continue to opt for public financing systems. Of course, enhanced competition under low limits is only one factor to be considered. Competition, after all, is one key goal in electoral reform, but not the only one. We may wish also to encourage citizen participation and voter engagement. But if we are looking for reasons not to enact low limits, a deleterious impact on competition is not one of them. For this reason, the Supreme Court was wrong in Randall v. Sorrell.

Our joint findings make it plain: low contribution limits and public financing substantially narrow the gap between incumbents and challengers. These reforms can be mutually enhancing as reasonable contribution limits are central to a well-functioning public financing system. Incumbency will continue to provide electoral advantages. However, decreasing the vote margins between votes cast for incumbents and their challengers signals greater electoral competiveness and, as such, strengthens democracy.

Keywords: contribution limits, public financing, electoral competition, incumbency, challengers, Randall v. Sorrell, Supreme Court

Suggested Citation

Williams, Kahlil and Stratmann, Thomas and Torres-Spelliscy, Ciara, Electoral Competition and Low Contribution Limits (May 7, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1400740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1400740

Kahlil Williams

New York University (NYU) - Brennan Center for Justice ( email )

161 Avenue of the Americas
12th Floor
New York, NY 10013
United States

Thomas Stratmann

George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2330 (Phone)

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mercatus.org/scholars/thomas-stratmann

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy (Contact Author)

Stetson University College of Law ( email )

1401 61st Street South
Gulfport, FL 33707
United States

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