Inferring Strategic Voting
50 Pages Posted: 13 May 2009 Last revised: 5 May 2012
Date Written: April 17, 2012
We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [1.4%, 4.2%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.
Keywords: strategic voting, set estimation, partially identified models, discrete choice models
JEL Classification: D7, H8
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation