A Theory of Combative Advertising

Marketing Science, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1-19, 2009

Posted: 14 May 2009

See all articles by Yuxin Chen

Yuxin Chen

New York University (NYU) - Department of Marketing

Yogesh V. Joshi

University of Maryland - Department of Marketing

Jagmohan S. Raju

University of Pennsylvania - Marketing Department

Z. John Zhang

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Department of Marketing

Date Written: January 2009

Abstract

In mature markets with competing firms, a common role for advertising is to shift consumer preferences towards the advertiser in a tug-of-war, with no effect on category demand. In this paper, we analyze the effect of such "combative" advertising on market power. We show that, depending on the nature of consumer response, combative advertising can reduce price competition to benefit competing firms. However, it can also lead to a pro-competitive outcome where individual firms advertise to increase own profitability, but collectively become worse off. This is because combative advertising can intensify price competition such that an "advertising war" leads to a "price war." Similar to price competition, advertising competition can result in a prisoner's dilemma where all competing firms make less profit even when the effect of each firm's advertising is to enhance consumer preferences in its favor. Given such pro-competitive effects, we further show that cost of combative advertising could be a blessing in disguise -- higher unit cost of advertising resulting in lower equilibrium levels of advertising, leading to higher prices and profits. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how combative advertising by competing brands influences consumer preferences. Our experimental analysis offers strong support for our conclusions.

Keywords: advertising, persuasion, game theory, competitive strategy, prisoner's dilemma, preference shifts

Suggested Citation

Chen, Yuxin and Joshi, Yogesh V. and Raju, Jagmohan S. and Zhang, Z. John, A Theory of Combative Advertising (January 2009). Marketing Science, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1-19, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1402892

Yuxin Chen

New York University (NYU) - Department of Marketing ( email )

Henry Kaufman Ctr
44 W 4 St.
New York, NY
United States
212-995-0511 (Phone)
212-995-4006 (Fax)

Yogesh V. Joshi (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Marketing ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

Jagmohan S. Raju

University of Pennsylvania - Marketing Department ( email )

700 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
3730 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6340
United States
215-898-1114 (Phone)
215-898-2534 (Fax)

Z. John Zhang

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Department of Marketing ( email )

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