Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption

Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 4, pp. 275, 2001

22 Pages Posted: 18 May 2009

Date Written: 2001

Abstract

During the 1990s, the OECD and numerous other international organizations adopted conventions and other instruments designed to control bribery and corruption in international business. The WTO, however, took no such action, and a related initiative on transparency in government procurement has not yet produced any results. This article examines what one can learn about rule-making in the WTO from its failure to act in this case. Much of the explanation for the inaction lay outside the organization, in the political incentives facing major actors. Yet structural characteristics of the WTO, its approach to legalization, and its negotiating processes also played significant roles. These factors should be addressed if the organization is to deal effectively with the controversial issues now on its agenda.

Keywords: World Trade Organization, international organizations, international business

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Kenneth Wayne, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption (2001). Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 4, pp. 275, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1402964

Kenneth Wayne Abbott (Contact Author)

Arizona State University ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
480-965-5917 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
180
Abstract Views
1,798
rank
166,255
PlumX Metrics