Hard and Soft Law in International Governance

International Organization, Vol. 54, p. 421, 2000

36 Pages Posted: 18 May 2009

See all articles by Kenneth W. Abbott

Kenneth W. Abbott

Arizona State University

Duncan Snidal

University of Chicago

Date Written: 2000


We examine why international actors -- including states, firms, and activists -- create different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems. We show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances. We begin by examining the baseline advantages of "hard" legalization (that is, precise, legally binding obligations with appropriate third-party delegation). We emphasize, however, that actors often prefer softer forms of legalization (that is, various combinations of reduced precision, less stringent obligation, and weaker delegation). Soft legalization has a number of significant advantages: it is easier to achieve, provides strategies for dealing with uncertainty, infringes less on sovereignty, and facilitates compromise among differentiated actors. Although our approach is largely interest-based, we explicitly incorporate the normative elements that are central in law and in recent international relations theorizing. We also consider the important role of nonstate actors who, along with states, are central participants in contemporary international legalization. We illustrate the advantages of various forms of international legal arrangements with examples drawn from articles in this special issue and elsewhere.

Keywords: International law, international relations, politics

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Kenneth Wayne and Snidal, Duncan, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance (2000). International Organization, Vol. 54, p. 421, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1402966

Kenneth Wayne Abbott (Contact Author)

Arizona State University ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
480-965-5917 (Phone)

Duncan Snidal

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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