15 Pages Posted: 18 May 2009
Date Written: May 2008
An earlier article of mine, 'Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating Distinction and its Place in the Theory of Rights', was devoted to rebutting Judith Jarvis Thomson's arguments in favor of incorporating the distinction between (permissibly) infringing and (impermissibly) violating a right. In 'A Defence of Infringement', Andrew Botterell maintains that my criticisms and attempted rebuttals of Thomson's position fail, and that despite my efforts to show otherwise, the category of right infringements is secure. In this reply, I explain why I demur.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Oberdiek, John, What's Wrong with Infringements (Insofar as Infringements are Not Wrong)?: A Reply (May 2008). Law and Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1403318