Corporate Security and Private Justice: Danger Signs?

European Journal of Crime, Criminal and Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 97-111

Posted: 14 May 2009 Last revised: 5 Nov 2009

See all articles by Clarissa Meerts

Clarissa Meerts

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Criminology, Students

Nicholas Dorn

Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London

Date Written: May 13, 2009

Abstract

This paper explores the role of corporate security in the control of economic crime within private sector companies and public sector organisations in the Netherlands, setting personal interviews with security providers in the context of existing literature. Companies/organisations experiencing internally-generated crime or integrity problems appreciate the private, confidential, controllable nature of corporate security services. In this sense it is clear why such services flourish, however two problems remain. First, little attention seems to have been paid to the question of why the state allows corporate security to function so autonomously. Second, the typical outcome of corporate security investigations into staff misconduct – termination of employment contracts, with agreed employment references – may result in displacement of criminal potential to other organisations.

Keywords: Corporate security, Governance and integrity, Employee crime, Private settlement, Criminal displacement, facilitation

Suggested Citation

Meerts, Clarissa and Dorn, Nicholas, Corporate Security and Private Justice: Danger Signs? (May 13, 2009). European Journal of Crime, Criminal and Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 97-111, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1403862

Clarissa Meerts (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.frg.eur.nl/pub/sectie_criminologie/sectieleden/

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Criminology, Students ( email )

Netherlands

Nicholas Dorn

Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London

Charles Clore House
17 Russell Square
London, WC1B 5DR
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://ials.sas.ac.uk/about/staff/staffres.asp

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