Rationalizable Implementation

22 Pages Posted: 14 May 2009

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 13, 2009

Abstract

This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.

Keywords: Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

JEL Classification: C79, D82

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, Rationalizable Implementation (May 13, 2009). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1403934

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Stephen Edward Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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