Gender Interactions within Hierarchies: Evidence from the Political Arena

55 Pages Posted: 19 May 2009

See all articles by Stefano Gagliarducci

Stefano Gagliarducci

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Daniele Paserman

Boston University - Department of Economics; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

This paper studies gender interactions within hierarchical organizations using a large data set on the duration of Italian municipal governments elected between 1993 and 2003. A municipal government can be viewed as a hierarchy, whose stability over time depends on the degree of cooperation between and within ranks.

We find that in municipalities headed by female mayors, the probability of early termination of the legislature is higher. This result persists and becomes stronger when we control for municipality fixed effects as well as non-random sorting of women into municipalities using regression discontinuity in gender-mixed electoral races decided by a narrow margin.

The likelihood that a female mayor survives until the end of her term is lowest when the council is entirely male, and in regions with less favorable attitudes towards working women. The evidence is suggestive that female mayors are less able at fostering cooperation among men, or alternatively, that men are more reluctant to be headed by women. Other interpretations receive less support in the data. Our results may provide an alternative explanation for the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions.

Keywords: Discrimination, Gender, Government stability, Hierarchies

JEL Classification: H72, I16, M54

Suggested Citation

Gagliarducci, Stefano and Paserman, Daniele, Gender Interactions within Hierarchies: Evidence from the Political Arena (April 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7272. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1405069

Stefano Gagliarducci (Contact Author)

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/stefanogagliarducci/

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Daniele Paserman

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, IL Jerusalem 91905
Israel

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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