Trust and Reciprocity Among International Groups: Experimental Evidence from Austria and Japan

43 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2009 Last revised: 18 Aug 2010

See all articles by Kenju Akai

Kenju Akai

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

Robert J. Netzer

University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 18, 2010

Abstract

This paper explores national identity in trust and reciprocity at the intra- and international levels by adopting a modified trust game played among groups from Austria and Japan, in which subjects play the roles of trustor and trustee consecutively without any information feedback. Intra- and international trust levels are identical across nationalities. Intranational reciprocity in Austria is greater than in Japan, but there is no significant difference in international reciprocity between the two countries. We also examine the relationship between trust and reciprocity and the relathionship between trust/reciprocity and expectations, demographic variables, the individualism index, and trust indices. International trust enhances international reciprocity in both countries, although this effect is weaker in Japan than in Austria. Expected returns enhance trust in both countries at the intra- and international levels. In Japan, expected transfers enhance international reciprocity less than they do intranational reciprocity. A larger number of females in the group reduce international trust. In Austria, this reduces international trust more than it does intranational trust.

Keywords: Trust, Reciprocity, Trust game, Group norm, International team experiment

JEL Classification: C92, C71

Suggested Citation

Akai, Kenju and Netzer, Robert J., Trust and Reciprocity Among International Groups: Experimental Evidence from Austria and Japan (August 18, 2010). ISER Discussion Paper. No. 737, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1406285 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1406285

Kenju Akai (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
06-6879-8552 (Phone)
06-6879-8584 (Fax)

Robert J. Netzer

University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics ( email )

Austria

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