Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 167, No. 2, 202-223
29 Pages Posted: 18 May 2009 Last revised: 29 Oct 2012
Date Written: April 22, 2009
This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the strategic alliance before completing the joint project. I formally derive a situation in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is a component of an optimal contract, in particular, in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is superior to the contract with the cash transfer only. I also analyze optimal equity stake sizes. The results provide new empirical implications for partial stock ownership from the viewpoint of specific investment incentives in strategic alliances under the possibility of the reallocation of corporate resources.
Keywords: cross-shareholdings, equity participation, optimal incentives, partial ownership, strategic alliance
JEL Classification: D82, D86, G32, G34, L14, L24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Osano, Hiroshi, Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources (April 22, 2009). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 167, No. 2, 202-223. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1406323 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1406323