Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation

33 Pages Posted: 19 May 2009

See all articles by Kjell Arne Brekke

Kjell Arne Brekke

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; University of Oslo - Frisch Center

Karen Evelyn Hauge

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Jo Thori Lind

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Karine Nyborg

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 2009

Abstract

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a fixed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.

Keywords: altruism, conditional, cooperation, self-selection

JEL Classification: D11, D12, D64, H41

Suggested Citation

Brekke, Kjell Arne and Hauge, Karen Evelyn and Lind, Jo Thori and Nyborg, Karine, Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (May 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2647, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1406949

Kjell Arne Brekke

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+47 22 84 11 69 (Phone)

University of Oslo - Frisch Center ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway
+47 22 95 88 19 (Phone)
+47 22 95 88 25 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: www.frisch.uio.no

Karen Evelyn Hauge

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research ( email )

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

Jo Thori Lind (Contact Author)

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Karine Nyborg

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O.Box 1095 Blindern
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://folk.uio.no/karineny/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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