Mechanism Choice

PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, eds., Forthcoming

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 250

44 Pages Posted: 21 May 2009 Last revised: 6 Oct 2012

See all articles by Jonathan B. Wiener

Jonathan B. Wiener

Duke University

Barak D. Richman

Duke University, School of Law

Date Written: July 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper is a draft of a chapter for a forthcoming book, Public Choice and Public Law, edited by Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, to be published by Edward Elgar. This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research.

Suggested Citation

Wiener, Jonathan Baert and Richman, Barak D., Mechanism Choice (July 1, 2009). PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, eds., Forthcoming, Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 250, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1408163

Jonathan Baert Wiener

Duke University ( email )

Box 90360
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United States
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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/wiener/

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)

Duke University, School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

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