The Efficient and Fair Approval of Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit Projects Under Unilateral Information

20 Pages Posted: 26 May 2009

See all articles by Nava Kahana

Nava Kahana

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yosef Mealem

Netanya Academic College

Shmuel Nitzan

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost-single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

Keywords: indivisible project, single beneficiary, multiple-cost bearers, unilateral information, efficient and fair implementation

JEL Classification: D61, D62, D78

Suggested Citation

Kahana, Nava and Mealem, Yosef and Nitzan, Shmuel, The Efficient and Fair Approval of Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit Projects Under Unilateral Information. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4181. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1409285

Nava Kahana (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yosef Mealem

Netanya Academic College

1 University St
Netanya 42100, 4223587
Israel

Shmuel Nitzan

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972.3.531.8930 (Phone)
+972.3.535.3180 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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