Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

18 Pages Posted: 27 May 2009

See all articles by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus

Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus

University of Lausanne

Flip Klijn

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History

Markus Walzl

Bamberg University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 26, 2009

Abstract

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate markets with no and with a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Examples 1 and 2).

Keywords: core, farsighted stability, one- and two-sided matching, roommate markets, von Neumann-Morgenstern stability

JEL Classification: C62, C71, C78

Suggested Citation

Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth and Klijn, Flip and Walzl, Markus, Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (May 26, 2009). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 09-135, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1410230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1410230

Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, Vaud CH-1015
Switzerland

Flip Klijn

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

Markus Walzl

Bamberg University - Department of Economics ( email )

Kirschaeckerstrasse 39
Bamberg, 96045
Germany

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