'Obvious' Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School, and the Courts

POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW, Antonio Cucinotta, ed., Edward Elgar Pub. Co., 2002

32 Pages Posted: 28 May 2009 Last revised: 22 Sep 2015

See all articles by John E. Lopatka

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Date Written: May 27, 2009

Abstract

This book chapter, published in 2002, argues that courts decide antitrust cases based mainly on their perception of the “obvious” effects of the practices at issue on consumers. Courts must rely on both theory and evidence in resolving antitrust cases, but the persuasiveness of theoretical predictions depends in large part on the determinacy of their implications for consumers. Theories of liability are often too restrictive in their assumptions and markets are often too complex to allow confident predictions that a practice that obviously benefits consumers in the short run will ultimately hurt them in the long run, or vice versa.

Suggested Citation

Lopatka, John E. and Page, William Hepburn, 'Obvious' Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School, and the Courts (May 27, 2009). POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW, Antonio Cucinotta, ed., Edward Elgar Pub. Co., 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1410785

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
111
Abstract Views
828
rank
252,414
PlumX Metrics