Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decisionmaking

54 Pages Posted: 30 May 2009

See all articles by John E. Lopatka

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Date Written: May, 29 2009

Abstract

This article, published in 1995, analyzes the use of the concept of network externalities in the Antitrust Division's first antitrust case against Microsoft. That case resulted in a consent decree that, among other things, prohibited Microsoft from imposing per processor licenses of its Windows operating system. The article challenges the claim that the practices at issue in the case were more likely to be harmful or long-lived because of the presence of network externalities in the market for computer operating systems.

Keywords: antitrust, network effects, microsoft, monopolization

JEL Classification: D42, D62, K21, L12, L41

Suggested Citation

Lopatka, John E. and Page, William Hepburn, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decisionmaking (May, 29 2009). Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 40, 1995. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1411647

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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