Credal Probability

10 Pages Posted: 30 May 2009

See all articles by David H. Kaye

David H. Kaye

PSU - Penn State Law (University Park); ASU - College of Law & School of Life Sciences

Date Written: 1991


This article responds to Paul Bergman and Al Moore's doubt that ideal triers of facts would be Bayesians. They argue that Bayes' rule, and probability theory in general, fails as a theoretical factfinding model. While probability has long been an accepted measure of belief in empirical propositions and the validity of inductive arguments, this articles addresses Bergman and Moore's doubts directly. It shows how their examples demonstrating the "frequentist" character of Bayesian methodology or the fallacies in Bayesian analysis are easily handled without a frequentist interpretation of probability. Then it shows that an ideal juror's partial beliefs will conform to the calculus of probabilities.

Keywords: Paul Bergman, Al Moore, Bayes’ Rule, Probability

Suggested Citation

Kaye, David H., Credal Probability (1991). Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 13, 1991, Available at SSRN:

David H. Kaye (Contact Author)

PSU - Penn State Law (University Park)

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States


ASU - College of Law & School of Life Sciences ( email )

111 E Taylor St.
Phoenix, AZ 85004
United States


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