The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations
William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stanford L. Rev. 1445 (1985)
68 Pages Posted: 30 May 2009
Date Written: May 29, 2009
This article, published in 1985, defines the scope of antitrust liability by reconciling the doctrines of antitrust injury and standing with the standard of optimal deterrence. Under the proposed approach, the antitrust injury inquiry provides a first approximation of the optimal penalty by limiting recovery to harms that are proportional to the offense's harm to economic efficiency. The standing inquiry provides a second approximation by limiting the right to sue to those classes of plaintiffs whose antitrust injury is least costly to calculate and involves the lowest risk of error.
Keywords: antitrust, antitrust injury, standing, optimal deterrence
JEL Classification: d61,k21,k41,k42,l41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation