Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy, and the Competitor Plaintiff

Antitrust Injury, the Competitor Plaintiff, and Merger Policy, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 127 (1996)

24 Pages Posted: 30 May 2009

See all articles by William H. Page

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law

Date Written: May 29, 2009

Abstract

This article, published in 1996, responds to Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1995). Brodley argues that the courts' strict interpretation of the antitrust injury doctrine has undermined merger enforcement by denying competitors and takeover targets the right to sue to challenge anticompetitive mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. We argue that public merger enforcement is generally effective in preventing anticompetitive mergers, and that the antitrust injury doctrine properly limits rivals' right to sue in merger cases. We particularly dispute Brodley's claim that mergers that pose a risk of coordinated monopoly pricing also pose a risk of anticompetitive exclusion.

Keywords: antitrust, antitrust injury, mergers, private right of action

JEL Classification: l12, l13, K21, L41

Suggested Citation

Page, William Hepburn and Lopatka, John E., Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy, and the Competitor Plaintiff (May 29, 2009). Antitrust Injury, the Competitor Plaintiff, and Merger Policy, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 127 (1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1411824

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

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