Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy, and the Competitor Plaintiff
Antitrust Injury, the Competitor Plaintiff, and Merger Policy, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 127 (1996)
24 Pages Posted: 30 May 2009
Date Written: May 29, 2009
This article, published in 1996, responds to Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1995). Brodley argues that the courts' strict interpretation of the antitrust injury doctrine has undermined merger enforcement by denying competitors and takeover targets the right to sue to challenge anticompetitive mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. We argue that public merger enforcement is generally effective in preventing anticompetitive mergers, and that the antitrust injury doctrine properly limits rivals' right to sue in merger cases. We particularly dispute Brodley's claim that mergers that pose a risk of coordinated monopoly pricing also pose a risk of anticompetitive exclusion.
Keywords: antitrust, antitrust injury, mergers, private right of action
JEL Classification: l12, l13, K21, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation