Judicial Torture as War of Attrition

27 Pages Posted: 30 May 2009

See all articles by Kong-Pin Chen

Kong-Pin Chen

Academia Sinica - Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences; National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Chien-Fu Chou

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Tsung-Sheng Tsai

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 26, 2009

Abstract

By modeling judicial torture as a war of attrition, the paper derives the optimal strategies of the magistrate and the accused defendant as functions of their characteristics and the nature of uncertainty. Torture can occur as an equilibrium outcome in which both parties take costly actions to overcome informational barriers. Whether the magistrate will torture, and its result if he does, is shown to depend on how he evaluates the loss of type II error against the torturee's pain, his belief on how likely it is that the defendant is guilty, and the defendant's disutility of being tortured relative to the legal penalty of crime.

Keywords: torture, type I and II errors, evidence, war of attrition, imperfect information

Suggested Citation

Chen, Kong-Pin and Chou, Chien-Fu and Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, Judicial Torture as War of Attrition (May 26, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1412066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1412066

Kong-Pin Chen (Contact Author)

Academia Sinica - Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

RCHSS
Academia Sinica
Nankang, Taipei, 11529
Taiwan
886 2 2789 8160 (Phone)
886 2 2785 4160 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://idv.sinica.edu.tw/kongpin/

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

Chien-Fu Chou

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics ( email )

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

Tsung-Sheng Tsai

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics ( email )

No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Rd.
Taipei, 10617
Taiwan

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~tstsai

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