Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 467, 1980
38 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2009
Date Written: June 2, 2009
This article, published in 1980, proposes a theory linking the antitrust injury doctrine to the standard of economic efficiency. Private injuries from practices like mergers, tying arrangements, and resale price fixing do not necessarily correspond to any inefficiency that the practices cause. Awarding treble damages for all private harms would thus run the risk of overdeterrence. The article argues that the antitrust injury doctrine can partially redress this imbalance between the private and social costs of antitrust violations by requiring that private harm be connected to the anticompetitive aspect of alleged violations.
Keywords: antitrust, antitrust injury, damages
JEL Classification: L41, L42, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation