Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 467, 1980

38 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2009

See all articles by William H. Page

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Date Written: June 2, 2009

Abstract

This article, published in 1980, proposes a theory linking the antitrust injury doctrine to the standard of economic efficiency. Private injuries from practices like mergers, tying arrangements, and resale price fixing do not necessarily correspond to any inefficiency that the practices cause. Awarding treble damages for all private harms would thus run the risk of overdeterrence. The article argues that the antitrust injury doctrine can partially redress this imbalance between the private and social costs of antitrust violations by requiring that private harm be connected to the anticompetitive aspect of alleged violations.

Keywords: antitrust, antitrust injury, damages

JEL Classification: L41, L42, K21

Suggested Citation

Page, William Hepburn, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury (June 2, 2009). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 47, p. 467, 1980. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413325

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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