Devising a Microsoft Remedy that Serves Consumers

36 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2009

See all articles by John E. Lopatka

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Date Written: June 2, 2009

Abstract

This article analyzes Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's structural remedy in the Microsoft case. Published in 2001, before the D.C. Circuit's decision reversing Judge Jackson's order, the article argues that "any severe restructuring of Microsoft, including the separation of its applications and operating systems activities ordered by the court, will almost certainly raise prices to consumers and will fail to produce long-term competitive benefits." The article also "sketches the content of a conduct remedy tailored to promote consumer interests." For our views on the eventual final judgments, see William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, The Microsoft Case: Antitrust, High Technology, and Consumer Welfare (Univ. of Chicago Press 2007).

Keywords: antitrust, monopolization, structural remedies, divestiture, conduct remedies

JEL Classification: K21, K41, K42, L12, L41

Suggested Citation

Lopatka, John E. and Page, William Hepburn, Devising a Microsoft Remedy that Serves Consumers (June 2, 2009). George Mason Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, p.691, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413390 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1413390

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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