The Summons Power and the Limits of Theory: A Reply to Professor Hyman

Tulane Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 6, 1997

Posted: 3 Dec 1998  

Leo P. Martinez

University of California Hastings College of the Law

Date Written: May 1997

Abstract

Professor David Hyman's recent article, "When Rules Collide: Procedural Intersection and the Rule of Law," which appeared in the last issue of the Tulane Law Review, explains the problems associated with what he terms "procedural intersections." Professor Hyman finds that a "procedural intersection" occurs when parties are engaged in separate adjudicative proceedings in different fora, regarding the same issue, and each forum offers competing procedural rules.

Dean Martinez's criticism of Professor Hyman's theory is not centered on the grand vision Professor Hyman takes, but rather on the narrow grounds that would appear to preclude the use of the administrative summons power in the Tax Court.

The criticism is in three parts. The first part is that Professor Hyman's theory understates the extent of the sovereign's power to tax. The second is that Professor Hyman's theory emphasizes the "level playing field" in the tax context to an unjustified extent. The third is that Professor Hyman's theoretical construct simply does not apply in the Tax Court.

Suggested Citation

Martinez, Leo P., The Summons Power and the Limits of Theory: A Reply to Professor Hyman (May 1997). Tulane Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 6, 1997. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=141381

Leo P. Martinez (Contact Author)

University of California Hastings College of the Law ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States
415-565-4682 (Phone)
415-565-4865 (Fax)

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