Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation

Duke Law Journal, p. 618, 1987

51 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2009

See all articles by William H. Page

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Date Written: June 3, 2009

Abstract

This article, published in 1987, responds to John Shepard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1986). In an earlier article, I argued that the "clear articulation" requirement is the best criterion for "state action" antitrust immunity because it reinforces representative (as opposed to administrative) political processes. Wiley argued, however, that even clearly articulated state economic choices are illegitimate, and should therefore not be immune, if they are the product of capture by interest groups. I argue in response that the Madisonian gauntlet of state legislative processes provides a more appropriate basis for deference to state economic choices than the theory of legislative capture.

Keywords: antitrust, state action immunity, exemption

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L4, L43

Suggested Citation

Page, William Hepburn, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation (June 3, 2009). Duke Law Journal, p. 618, 1987. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413845

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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