Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare

George Washington Law Review, Vol. 69, p. 367, 2001

58 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2009

See all articles by John E. Lopatka

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Date Written: June 3, 2009

Abstract

This article, published in 2001, considers the appropriate standards for monopolization cases in which the defendant has allegedly reduced innovation by refusing to deal with the plaintiffs. We note that claims of reduced innovation are problematic, particularly in dynamic markets, because economic theory does not often allow a confident prediction of what would have happened but for the defendant's conduct. Consequently, there is a danger that antitrust law will too readily shift the burden to the defendant to justify conduct simply because it has harmed a rival. We suggest that plaintiffs in such cases should be required to support their claims with a plausible theory and evidence, and that the burden should be greater in cases in which the defendant's conduct produced immediate consumer benefits.

Keywords: antitrust, monopolization, Microsoft, Intel, innovation

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L41, O31

Suggested Citation

Lopatka, John E. and Page, William Hepburn, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare (June 3, 2009). George Washington Law Review, Vol. 69, p. 367, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413855

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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