Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling

Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 52, p. 891, 2001

38 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2009

See all articles by John E. Lopatka

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law

William H. Page

University of Florida - Levin College of Law

Date Written: June 3, 2009

Abstract

This article, published in 2001, argues that bundling of broadband transmission and Internet services by cable companies does not pose a sufficient risk of harm to innovation to justify a regulatory or antitrust requirement of open access.

Keywords: antitrust, cable, internet, bundling

JEL Classification: K21, K21, L12, L41

Suggested Citation

Lopatka, John E. and Page, William Hepburn, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling (June 3, 2009). Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 52, p. 891, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413947

John E. Lopatka

The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) – Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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