The Political Economy of Relief Aid Allocation: Evidence from Madagascar

LICOS Disussion Paper No. 237/2009

45 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2009

See all articles by Nathalie Francken

Nathalie Francken

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - LICOS Center for Transition Economics

Bart Minten

Cornell University - Food and Nutrition Policy Program; Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Agro-Engineering and Economics

Johan F. M. Swinnen

KU Leuven - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS); European Commission, DG II

Date Written: May 2009

Abstract

This paper studies the political economy of relief aid allocation using empirical evidence from relief programs after a major cyclone (Gafilo) hit Madagascar in March 2004. Relief was provided by the Government of Madagascar as well as local and international aid agencies. Aid allocation was generally more likely in areas with a higher need for aid, but there were substantial differences between aid allocation by the government and by international aid agencies. The likelihood of receiving aid from the government was higher in cyclone-affected communes with higher radio coverage and with stronger political support for the government. Relief from aid agencies was not affected by media or political factors but was more likely to go to poorer and easier accessible communes, whether or not they were affected by the cyclone.

Keywords: political economy, natural disasters, aid, Madagascar, Africa

Suggested Citation

Francken, Nathalie and Minten, Bart and Swinnen, Johan F.M., The Political Economy of Relief Aid Allocation: Evidence from Madagascar (May 2009). LICOS Disussion Paper No. 237/2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1414748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1414748

Nathalie Francken (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - LICOS Center for Transition Economics ( email )

Waaistraat 6 - box 3511
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

Bart Minten

Cornell University - Food and Nutrition Policy Program ( email )

BP 6313
Antananarivo 101
Madagascar
033 11 38520 (Phone)
261 20 2222198 (Fax)

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Agro-Engineering and Economics ( email )

Kardinaal Mercierlaan 92
Heverlee, B-3001
Belgium

Johan F.M. Swinnen

KU Leuven - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (LICOS) ( email )

Waaistraat 6
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

European Commission, DG II ( email )

Wetstrath 200
Office 15172
1049 Brussels
Belgium
+32-2-2960442 (Phone)
Not available (Fax)

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