The Politics of Court Budgeting in the States: is Judicial Independence Threatened by the Budgetary Process?

Public Administration Review, Vol. 63, pp. 441-454, July/August 2003

15 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2009

See all articles by James W. Douglas

James W. Douglas

University of South Carolina

Roger E. Hartley

University of Baltimore

Date Written: June 8, 2009

Abstract

Judicial independence in American politics has been hailed as a means of preserving individual liberty and minority rights against the actions of the majoritarian branches of government. Re- cently, however, legal professionals and scholars of the courts have begun to question the magni- tude of judicial independence, suggesting that budgeting and finance issues pose a threat to judicial independence. This article explores whether state judiciaries are being threatened on this front by soliciting the perceptions of key state officials. Using surveys of court administrators, executive budget officers, and legislative budget officers in the states, we examine three aspects of the politics of judicial budgeting: competing for scarce resources, interbranch competition, and pressure to raise revenues. The survey responses suggest that, in a substantial number of states, judicial independence has, at times, been threatened by interbranch competition and pressures to raise revenues

Keywords: Judicial Independence, budgets, budget politics, intergovernmental relations, attacks on courts, state courts

Suggested Citation

Douglas, James W. and Hartley, Roger E., The Politics of Court Budgeting in the States: is Judicial Independence Threatened by the Budgetary Process? (June 8, 2009). Public Administration Review, Vol. 63, pp. 441-454, July/August 2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1416269

James W. Douglas

University of South Carolina ( email )

Government and International Studies
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-2707 (Phone)
803-777-8255 (Fax)

Roger E. Hartley (Contact Author)

University of Baltimore ( email )

Baltimore, MD 21214
United States
828-458-0944 (Phone)

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