The Effect of Crosslisting on Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence

15 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2009

See all articles by Stephen P. Ferris

Stephen P. Ferris

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance

Kenneth Kim

SUNY at Buffalo - School of Management

Gregory Noronha

University of Washington, Tacoma - Milgard School of Business

Abstract

This review of the empirical evidence will contribute to the identification of a set of best practices that can lead to improved governance for firms worldwide. Furthermore, the discussion of what remains unexamined by governance researchers will help to shape the contours of future policy and legislative debate. This study synthesizes the extensive empirical work done on crosslisting and consequent changes in corporate governance structures. It also highlights a number of areas that require further research including more direct testing of governance changes following crosslisting, the effect of crosslisting on corporate equity ownership structures, and the investment/new securities issuance behavior of firms subsequent to crosslisting. This research will help to chart the path of future academic study by scholars of international corporate governance. After a review of the existing literature, we conclude that there is substantial support for legal bonding in the decision to crosslist, with lesser evidence consistent with reputational bonding. We also conclude that firm growth opportunities and the need for external capital are critical factors in a decision to crosslist. This review essay examines the mechanisms by which crosslisting of a firm's shares on a foreign stock exchange and its subsequent exposure to an international capital market can induce changes in corporate governance. We also review reasons why a firm might elect to use crosslisting to improve investor perception of the quality of its governance.

This review essay examines the mechanisms by which crosslisting of a firm's shares on a foreign stock exchange and its subsequent exposure to an international capital market can induce changes in corporate governance. We also review reasons why a firm might elect to use crosslisting to improve investor perception of the quality of its governance.

After a review of the existing literature, we conclude that there is substantial support for legal bonding in the decision to crosslist, with lesser evidence consistent with reputational bonding. We also conclude that firm growth opportunities and the need for external capital are critical factors in a decision to crosslist.

This study synthesizes the extensive empirical work done on crosslisting and consequent changes in corporate governance structures. It also highlights a number of areas that require further research including more direct testing of governance changes following crosslisting, the effect of crosslisting on corporate equity ownership structures, and the investment/new securities issuance behavior of firms subsequent to crosslisting. This research will help to chart the path of future academic study by scholars of international corporate governance.

This review of the empirical evidence will contribute to the identification of a set of best practices that can lead to improved governance for firms worldwide. Furthermore, the discussion of what remains unexamined by governance researchers will help to shape the contours of future policy and legislative debate.

Suggested Citation

Ferris, Stephen P. and Kim, Kenneth A. and Noronha, Gregory, The Effect of Crosslisting on Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17, Issue 3, pp. 338-352, May 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1416360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00743.x

Stephen P. Ferris (Contact Author)

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance ( email )

214 Middlebush Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-6272 (Phone)
573-884-6296 (Fax)

Kenneth A. Kim

SUNY at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14222
United States

Gregory Noronha

University of Washington, Tacoma - Milgard School of Business ( email )

1900 Commerce Street
Campus Box 358420
Tacoma, WA 98402-3100
United States

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