Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The Problem of Simultaneity

24 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2009 Last revised: 27 Oct 2012

Eric M. Fraser

Osborn Maledon, PA

Date Written: June 10, 2009

Abstract

Google Books represents the latest attempt at the centuries-old goal to build a universal library. In 2004, Google started scanning books from libraries around the world. Although it made copyright licensing agreements with some publishers, it did not obtain permission from each rightsholder before scanning, indexing, and displaying portions of books from the stacks of libraries. Unsurprisingly, authors and publishers sued for copyright violations. Google settled the class action lawsuit in a sweeping agreement that has raised suspicion from librarians, users, and the government. In this paper, I analyze the antitrust and competition issues in the original and amended settlement agreements. I find that the simultaneous aspects of agreements and pricing pose serious antitrust problems. The settlement effectively gives Google simultaneous agreements with virtually all the rightsholders to in-copyright American books. The original agreement also would have required Google to set prices for books simultaneously. In a competitive market, both agreements and pricing would occur independently. Under current law, however, no potential competitor can make agreements with the rightsholders to orphan works. The simultaneity, therefore, concentrates pricing power, leading to cartel pricing (a problem under § 1 of the Sherman Act) and monopolization (a § 2 problem).

Keywords: Google, Book Search, Copyright, Antitrust, Simultaneity, Orphan Works

Suggested Citation

Fraser, Eric M., Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The Problem of Simultaneity (June 10, 2009). Stanford Technology Law Review, No. 4, September 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1417722

Eric M. Fraser (Contact Author)

Osborn Maledon, PA ( email )

2929 North Central Avenue
Suite 2100
Phoenix, AZ 85012
United States
602-640-9321 (Phone)

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