Peddling Influence through Intermediaries

75 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2009

See all articles by Wei Li

Wei Li

Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia

Date Written: June 11, 2009

Abstract

A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender is if his reputational concerns are low; but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased.

Keywords: strategic communication through intermediaries, agenda-pushing, media bias, reputational concerns

JEL Classification: C70, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Li, Wei, Peddling Influence through Intermediaries (June 11, 2009). American Economic Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1418251

Wei Li (Contact Author)

Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia ( email )

6000 Iona Drive
Vancouver, BC V6T 1L4
Canada
604-822-2839 (Phone)

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