Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory

UC Davis Working Paper No. 98-14

Posted: 13 Jan 1999

See all articles by Pierpaolo Battigalli

Pierpaolo Battigalli

University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) - Department of Economics (DEP); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)

Giacomo Bonanno

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Abstract

We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Bonanno, Giacomo F., Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory. UC Davis Working Paper No. 98-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=141864

Pierpaolo Battigalli

University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) - Department of Economics (DEP) ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Giacomo F. Bonanno

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-1574 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)

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