What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's Nox Trading Program

62 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2009 Last revised: 19 Mar 2023

See all articles by Meredith Fowlie

Meredith Fowlie

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Stephen P. Holland

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Bryan School of Business & Economics; University of California, Berkeley - Energy Institute

Erin T. Mansur

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2009

Abstract

A perceived advantage of cap-and-trade programs over more prescriptive environmental regulation is that enhanced compliance flexibility and cost effectiveness can make more stringent emissions reductions politically feasible. However, increased compliance flexibility can also result in an inequitable distribution of pollution. We investigate these issues in the context of Southern California's RECLAIM program. We match facilities in RECLAIM with similar California facilities also located in non-attainment areas. Our results indicate that emissions fell approximately 24 percent, on average, at RECLAIM facilities relative to our counterfactual. Furthermore, we find that observed changes in emissions do not vary significantly with neighborhood demographic characteristics.

Suggested Citation

Fowlie, Meredith and Holland, Stephen P. and Mansur, Erin T., What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's Nox Trading Program (June 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15082, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1418940

Meredith Fowlie (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )

735 South State Street, Weill Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Stephen P. Holland

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Bryan School of Business & Economics ( email )

401 Bryan Building
Greensboro, NC 27402-6179
United States

University of California, Berkeley - Energy Institute ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Erin T. Mansur

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603 646 2398 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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