The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

13 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2009

See all articles by Eva I. Hoppe

Eva I. Hoppe

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 13, 2009

Abstract

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

Keywords: Hidden information, adverse selection, information gathering

JEL Classification: D82, D86, C72

Suggested Citation

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W., The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures (June 13, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1418997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1418997

Eva I. Hoppe

University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )

Cologne, 50923
Germany

Patrick W. Schmitz (Contact Author)

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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