On the Negative Social Value of Central Banks' Knowledge Transparency

19 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 1999

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 2002

Abstract

We examine to what extent central banks should release their internal assessments concerning the links between money growth and future inflation, and between employment and inflation. We show that the social value of transparency concerning real shocks is negative since the disclosure of the central bank's private information eliminates the possibility of insuring the public against those shocks. Finally, we discuss a number of further arguments which have to be taken into account before policy conclusions can be drawn.

Note: Previously titled: On the Negative Social Value of Central Banks' Transparency

Keywords: Central banks, transparency, credibility, disclosure rules.

JEL Classification: E5, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans, On the Negative Social Value of Central Banks' Knowledge Transparency (April 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=141979 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.141979

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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